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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The principle of subsidiarity was introduced within European Treaties to prevent EU’s increasing 
competences from encroaching upon the power of lower levels of government. Nevertheless, the way in 
which the principle of subsidiarity has been operationalized (through so called “comparative efficiency test”)  
has decisively favored EU action, which is usually deemed to be the most suitable to achieve European 
objectives. This paper aims at assessing: first, if and to what extent national Parliaments, as national actors 
exercising their monitoring functions in the context of the early warning system, could reframe subsidiarity 
inquiry from a “comparative efficiency test” to a sort of “non encroachment (upon Member States) test”; 
second, if and to what extent Art. 4.2 TEU, aimed at protecting Member States national identities and 
essential State functions, could help in this respect. To this purpose, several national Parliament’s reasoned 
opinions mentioning the concept of national identities will be analysed. 
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1.	  Introduction	  
 
The rationale underlying the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity within the Treaty 
was the attempt to limit the action of the Union legislature and restrain its encroachment upon the 
power of lower level of governments (Estella 2002, Kumm, 2006, Schutze 2009). Nevertheless, the 
way in which the principle of subsidiarity has been operationalized (i.e. through the so called 
“comparative efficiency test”)  has decisively favoured European action at the expense of Member 
States action. By its side, the European Court of Justice has notoriously looked at the subsidiarity 
principle as a political rather than a legal concept, showing a strong deference towards the 
discretionary power of European institutions in assessing the compliance of Union acts with the 
principle of subsidiarity (Tridimas 2006; Martinico 2011, Biondi 2012).    
In other words, there is a puzzling contradiction between the reasons endorsing the introduction of 
the principle of subsidiarity during the 1990s—i.e. restrain the EU “competence creep”1—and the 
concrete purposes the subsidiarity test has served over the years (i.e. legitimizing EU action). 
Within this puzzle, the questions this paper tries to address are the following: could the subsidiarity 
inquiry be reframed to ask if, and to what extent, Union action is infringing upon Member 
States’action? If it is so, could Art. 4.2 TEU, aimed at protecting Member States “national 
identities” and “essential State functions”, and newly introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon, help in 
this respect?  
In trying to answer to these questions, the empirical part of this paper will be devoted to the action 
of national Parliaments for several reasons: first, the Treaty of Lisbon—through Protocol No. 2—
entitles national Parliaments to check the compliance of EU measures with the principle of 
subsdiarity through the so-called “Early Warning System”; second, this political and ex ante control 
on the respect of the principle of subsidiarity could prove to be more effective than the judicial and 
ex post control performed by the ECJ (on the distinction see Schütze 2009: 259 ss). Deciding 
whether an action should be taken either at the national or supranational level is a discretionary 
action which suits more the political stage of the drafting of the proposal than the legal stage of the 
review of legality of EU acts.  
 In order to assess if and to what extent Art. 4.2 TEU can add some value in reframing subsidiarity 
inquiry in a way which is more attentive to the protection of Member States’ scope of action, only 
the reasoned opinions mentioning Art. 4.2 TEU or the notion of national identities will be analysed. 
As we will see, there are already three EU proposals against which this has occurred: one on the 
                                                
1 The expression competence creep indicates the gradual expansion of Community comeptences at the expences of 
Member States ones. See S. Weatherill (2004). 
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award of concession contracts, one on the reintroduction of internal borders into the Schengen area, 
and one on the common fishery policy.   
The structure of the proposals is the following. Paragraph 2  is devoted to the reframing of 
subsidiarity inquiry from a “comparative efficiency test” to a sort of “non encroachment (upon 
Member States) test”. Paragraph 3 explores why Art. 4.2 TEU could serve the purpose of reframing 
subsidiarity inquiry in this respect. Paragraph 4, 5, and 6 focus, respectively, on three EU proposals 
which triggered reasoned opinions of national Parliaments within the framework of the EWS 
mentioning the concept of national identities. Paragraph 7 will develop some concluding remarks.     
 
2.	  Reframing	  subsidiarity	  inquiry:	  from	  an	  “EU	  value-­‐added”	  to	  an	  
“EU	  non	  encroachment”	  test?	  
 
Under Article 5.3 TEU, enshrining the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, “the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level”. Both the textual reading of the Treaty and the Commission’s 
interpretation of the Treaty suggest that the application of the principle of subsidiarity requires a test 
of “comparative efficiency”2 (i.e. determining what of the level of government can better achieve 
the proposed objective). In the 19th Annual Report on Better Lawmaking it is stated that “although 
subsidiarity cannot be assessed mechanically by reference to operational criteria, the Commission 
continues to use ‘necessity’ and ‘EU value-added’ tests as part of its analytical framework and 
recommends that others do likewise”.3  
As a matter of fact, European institutions do not always engage into an accurate analysis to explain 
why Union action is deemed to be more efficient than Member States’ one. According to the 
expectations of the Protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality  
attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam, in order to show that the objectives of the proposed action 
could be better achieved by Community (rather than Member States) action, European institution 
should have assessed: first, if the transnational aspects of the proposal cannot be satisfactorily 
regulated by action by the Member States; second, if the lack of Community action would conflict 
with the requirements of the Treaty or would otherwise significantly damage Member States’ 
                                                
2 Quoted in P. Craig and G. de Burca, (2011: 94). 
 
3 Annual Report from the Commission on the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, Brussels, 10.7.2012, 
COM(2012) 373 final, p. 3. 
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interests; third, if Community action would produce clear benefits by reasons of its scale or effects 
compared with Member States action.4 Moreover, the reasons for concluding that a Community 
objective can be better achieved by the Community must be substantiated by qualitative or, 
wherever possible, quantitative indicators”.5 Indeed, the laconic way in which European institutions 
justify the compliance of Union legislation with the principle of subsidiarity, does not always 
follow the Amsterdam Protocol guidelines. The result is that the invitation of the Protocol to 
interpret subsidiarity as a “dynamic concept” to be applied “in the light of the objectives set out in 
the Treaty”6—i.e. as a concept that “allows Community action within the limits of its powers to be 
expanded where circumstances so require, and conversely, to be restricted or discontinued where it 
is no longer justified”7—has been to a certain extent neglected, since European institutions tends 
always to justify Union action and consequently to endorse its expansion.  
For this reason, many scholars have criticized the concept of subsidiarity, or at least the way in 
which European institutions have interpreted it. For example, Schütze opined that subsidiarity 
should be interpreted as a requirement to check “whether the European legislator has unnecessarily 
restricted national autonomy”, i.e. that “subsidiarity properly understood is federal proportionality” 
(Schütze 2009: 533).8 Similarly, Davies argued that subsidiarity “misses the point”, as instead of 
striking a balance between Member State and EU interests, “it assumes the Community goals, 
privileges their achievement absolutely and simply asks who should be the one to do the 
implementing work” (Davies 2006: 67-68). In other words, the subsidiarity inquiry is misplaced 
because it does not focus on whether EU legislation is disproportionate by intruding too far into 
Member State values in relation to the objectives pursued by the EU.9 Consequently, Davies 
                                                
4 See in particular point 5 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity attached 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
 
5 Point 4 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
 
6 Point 3 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
 
7 Point 3 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
 
8 R. Schütze (2009: 533). On a comparison with the US system see E.T. Swaine (2000), and E. A. Young (2002). 
 
9 Davies notes that in all the Commission procedures for applying subsidiarity, set out in Commission’s impact 
assessment guidelines, “nowhere in the entire process s there any explicit consideration of national autonomy, nor any 
within of Community against Member State goals, except perhaps for the warning, repeated several times, that impact 
assessments are not a substitute for political judgment”. Moreover, “whether MS can achieve this outcome sufficiently 
is considered exclusively in terms of the problem itself and other Community goals…the emphasis is overwhelmingly 
on impacts on non-public actors such as consumers and industry, and where the impact on public bodies is – briefly – 
mentioned, the focus is on economic and functional factors. National …interests are further marginalized”. See Davies 
(2006: 76). 
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suggested that the ECJ should spell out the “competence function of proportionality”, i.e. should 
ask itself whether the importance of an EU is sufficient to justify its effect on national autonomy 
(Davies 2006: 83). 
However, in a most recent article, Paul Craig moved some convincing criticisms to Davies’ 
analysis. First, he noted that also Member States play a role in the definition of the “European 
objective” pursued by EU legislation. Second, he argued that, in Davies’ reasoning, “proportionality 
fulfills an independent competence role” which is “markedly different from use of proportionality 
within Article 5.3 TEU as part of the subsidiarity calculus” (Craig 2012: 83). In Craig’s words “The 
schema of proportionality in Article 5.3 and the Lisbon Protocol are not framed in terms of the kind 
of free-standing, competence based proportionality analysis. Nor is there any suggestion of such use 
of proportionality in the discussion that led to the Constitutional or Lisbon Treaties” (Craig 2012: 
83).  
The intuition that Art. 4.2 TEU could help in coping with what has been referred to as “the absence 
of a comfortable place in the legal framework for Member State interest” (Davies 2006: 67) stems 
from the working documents  of Art. I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty, namely the predecessor of 
Art. 4.2 TEU. These working documents, indeed, seem to attach to Art. 4.2 TEU the possibility to 
fulfill that “independent competence role” that Paul Craig deems to be missing in the working 
documents concerning the amendment of the principle of proportionality. The following paragraph 
will show how the drafting of Art. I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty (which reflects almost the same 
formulation of current Art. 4.2 TEU) is embedded in the discourse of delimitation of competences 
between the EU and the Member States, and could thus help reframing subsidiarity inquiry from a 
focus on the EU action “added-value” to a focus on EU action “non encroachment” upon Member 
States’one.    
 
3.	  The	  potential	  added	  value	  of	  Article	  4.2	  TEU	  on	  the	  protection	  
of	  “national	  identities”	  and	  “essential	  State	  functions”	  
 
The current formulation of the identity clause stems from the works of the European 
Convention drafting the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. If compared with Art. 6 TEU 
(Nice Version) which already required the EU to respect national identities of its Member States, 
Art. 4.2 TEU (Lisbon version) tries to clarify the scope of the concept of national identities, which 
are deemed  to be “inherent” in Member States’ “fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State 
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functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding national security”. 
 
Indeed, this novel formulation of the identity clause was first proposed by the Chair of working 
group V on “complementary competence”, Mr. Henning Christophersen – so to be consistently 
referred to as the “Christophersen clause” in all the working documents of the European 
Convention. Building on an analysis of the travaux préparatoires of this clause it has been already 
submitted that  “by expanding the concept of “national identities” so as to include Member States’ 
“fundamental structures” and by introducing a duty to respect “essential State functions” the 
drafters sought to carve out core areas of national sovereignty, as no list of Member States’ 
exclusive powers was eventually included in the Treaties” (Guastaferro 2012).   
The history of the clause shows that the clause was meant to solve a problem that had and still has a 
great relevance in the everyday life of EU law: to avoid the encroachment of Union action upon 
Member States’ prerogatives in the so-called “complementary competences” areas (e.g. education, 
culture, and sport).10 Notoriously, complementary competences basically include the policy areas—
such as culture, education, employment, customs cooperation, vocational training (where 
Community’s role should be limited to supporting, supplementing, or coordinating the action of the 
Member States) which are left substantive scope of action. The limited nature of Community power 
is usually expressed in legal basis which explicitly rule out harmonization measures. This is for 
example the case of employment, culture, and education where Community can encourage 
cooperation between Member States, it can—if necessary—support and supplement their action, but 
at the same time it cannot harmonize the laws and regulations of the Member States.11 
Nevertheless, within the EU legal orders there has always been a complicated and overlapping 
relationship between functional and sectorial competencies—i.e. between competence based on 
aims and competence based on fields.12 How to avoid that the EU in exercising a functional power 
(e.g. under the internal market) encroaches upon sectorial areas which explicitly exclude or 
precisely define Community action (e.g. education, culture, public health etc.)? 
In order to address this problem of the overlapping between functional and sectorial legal basis (the 
first allowing a broader scope of action to the EU at the expense of the Member States), one of the 
proposals was for example to draw a list of competences exclusive to the Member States, but this 
                                                
10 Complementary competences are now envisaged by Art. 6 TFEU. 
 
11 See, respectively, Art. 139 EC, Art. 151(5) EC, and Art. 149 EC. 
12 On such a distinction between types of federal competencies, also referred to as zielbezogeneKompetenzen 
(competencies based on aims) and sachbezogeneKompetenzen (competencies based on fields)— see A. von Bogdandy 
and J. Bast (2010: 287). 
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was rebuffed since it could have been against the principle of conferral, conveying the message that 
it was the Treaty to confer powers to the Member States and not the other way around. Among a set 
of other proposal, the idea of Mr. Christophersen to take as point of departure art.6, par 3—stating 
that “the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States”—end expand it by adding 
all those sensitive areas related to Member States sovereign powers was deemed to be a more 
balanced solution. The final formulation included into the notion of national identities the 
fundamental (political and constitutional) structures and some essential State functions such as 
national security and the territorial integrity of the State.  
In sum, the working documents on the drafting of the identity clause suggest that, at least in the 
intention of the drafters, Art. I-5 (now Art. 4.2 TEU) could address the same kind of concerns 
(protecting Member State’s autonomy from EU action) of the possible reframing of subsidiarity 
suggested by some scholarly literature and outlined in the previous paragraph. It is not a case, 
indeed, that Art. 4.2 TEU, and more generally, the notion of national identity, has been used by 
some national Parliaments in monitoring the compliance of EU action with the principle of 
subsidiarity both in the context of the EWS and in the context of the so called “political dialogue”. 
The following three paragraphs will be devoted to these reasoned opinions.  
 
4.	  The	  proposal	  on	  the	  award	  of	  concession	  contracts	  
 
The debate on the recent Commission Proposal on the award of concession contracts (COM 
(2011) 897 final) provides an excellent illustration of the role that the identity clause can play in 
safeguarding national autonomy. Art. 4.2 TEU, indeed, has been invoked—although not 
autonomously—against EU legislation that, while pursuing a legitimate objective (e.g. the 
functioning of the internal market), in fact encroaches upon an area in which Member State should 
enjoy a significant scope of action (e.g. services of general economic interest). 
 
In its proposal, the Commission adopted a purely internal market perspective. The proposal was 
based on Article 114 TFEU, which enables the adoption of harmonization measures to ensure the 
proper functioning of the internal market. In its explanatory memorandum, under the “subsidiarity” 
and “proportionality” headings, the Commission merely underlined that a common legal framework 
is required to ensure effective and equal access to concessions for economic operators across the 
single market and that the existing soft-law does not provide sufficient legal certainty and does not 
ensure compliance with the Treaty principles applicable to concessions. The Commission’s 
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memorandum makes hardly any reference to the area of the internal market affected by the 
proposed regulatory framework, that is to say that of Services of General Economic Interest. 
The Austrian Parliament adopted a reasoned opinion on the Commission’s proposal according to 
the ex ante subsidiarity review mechanism introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.13 In that opinion, the 
Austrian Parliament first noted that, contrary to the Commission’s findings, there is no legal 
vacuum in the area concerned by the proposal, as concession contracts are already governed by 
primary law principles such as non-discrimination, transparency and competition. Most importantly, 
the Austrian Parliament emphasized that the service concession contracts covered by the proposal 
are related to the provision of Services of General Economic Interest, an area where a number of 
Treaty Provisions (Art. 3 TEU, Art. 14 and 106 TFEU, Protocol 26) grant the Member State “a 
broad scope of discretionary action” (p.1). The Austrian Parliament inferred from such provisions 
and from Art. 4.2 TEU that “the flexibility granted to the Member States must not be curtailed by an 
extremely far-reaching act of secondary law” (p. 2). Instead, according to the Austrian Parliament, 
the proposed directive may have a significant impact on the structure of municipal service 
provision, especially in the municipal water sector which is provided on a cooperative basis.  
Also other national Parliaments have invited the Commission to frame the proposal taking into 
account the Treaty provisions on the services of general economic interests, which reserve to the 
Member States a significant scope of action. Protocol n. 26 which emphasizes the “essential role 
and wide discretion of national, regional and local authorities in providing, commissioning and 
organizing services of general economic interest as closely as possible to the needs of the users”—
in conjunction with Art. 4.2 TEU—have been invoked also by the Bavarian State Parliament14 
which has retained that the arguments put forward by the Commission to justify EU action in the 
field of service concessions (i.e. serious distortion of the internal market) have not been adequately 
supported. According to the Bavarian State Parliament “the Treaty of Lisbon has limited the scope 
for general EU provisions on service concessions which also concern local authorities Article 14 
TFEU and Protocol No 26 specify the important role and the wide discretion given to local 
authorities when deciding how services of general economic interest should be made available to 
their users and how they should be commissioned and organised. This particular safeguarding of 
local self-government has to be taken into account when regulating the award of service 
concessions, by preserving the scope for action and negotiation of local authorities and by 
accommodating the concerns of local services of general economic interest”. 
                                                
13 Reasoned Opinion of the European Affairs Committee of the Federal Council on COM (2011) 897 final, 1 February 
2011. 
 
14 Draft Resolution of the Bavarian State Parliament on the Proposal for a Directive on the award of concession 
contracts COM(2011) 897 - summarised by the subsidiarity team. 
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Also the Cortes Generales of Spain have expressed. Article 4(2) TEU states that the EU must 
respect the national identities of Member States, inclusive of regional and local self-government. 
Furthermore,  
similar concerns. On 6 March 2012, the Joint Committee for EU Affairs adopted a Resolution 
regarding the non compliance of the initiative with the principle of subsidiarity. The Joint 
Committee emphasises that the Commissions does not adequately explain why the differences 
among the national legal systems concerning the scope of provisions ruling the granting of 
concessions, represent an actual obstacle to market access, and thus justify EU action in the field of 
shared competences. There are two interesting aspects of the proposal: the first is that the 
Committee recalls that in the field of shared competences, when applying the principle of 
subsidiarity, the intervention of the Union is exceptional, in that it can only act in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States. “Therefore, 
according to this exceptional nature of the Union’s action, it must be the latter who is to justify to 
the greatest extent possible in terms of information, details and arguments, the existence of a 
problem affecting the basic principles of the European legal system (non discrimination, 
transparency, internal market and competitiveness)”. The second is that the Committee stresses that 
“what the proposal identifies as a problem is just the legal and cultural diverse reality of the 
countries that make up the Union, which has to be respected provided it does not represent an actual 
obstacle to the market, something that is far from being proven”. In endorsing the argument 
according to which the differences between Member States in terms of legal culture and practice 
with regard to service concessions, rather than constituting an obstacle to the market, should be 
taken in due account in EU action, the Joint Committee   refers to both a Resolution recently 
adopted on October 25th, 2011, by the European Parliament on the Modernisation of the Public 
Procurement and Art. 4.2 TEU on the protection of national identities of the Member States.15  
Finally, also the Italian Senate Standing Committee on European Union Policies seems to detect a 
prima facie violation of the principle of subsidiarity of the proposal of the award of concession 
contracts, in particular as regards the water sector, insofar as the nature of the “action proposed 
(regulation of a key public service) is such that it should be managed at a level as close as possible 
to a community. Supranational regulation would provide no added value”. Moreover, the Standing 
                                                
15 As stated in the opinion “Once more, the Resolution of the European Parliament of October 25, 2011, and its warning 
in the sense that “due account must be taken both of the complexity of the procedures and of the differences between 
Member States in terms of legal culture and practice with regard to service concessions”, must be borne in mind, and 
even more so from the certainty that this warning by the Parliament is delivered taking into account paragraph 2 of 
Article 4 of the Treaty on the European Union, which affirms that the Union shall respect the equality of Member States 
before the Treaties, as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government”. 
 
  9 
Committee states that “whereas water supply services are essential for the sheer existence of a 
community, they cannot be considered on a par with any other business sector, also in view of the 
need to ensure universal access to such commodity and following the outcome of the referendum of 
12 June 2011 and the ensuing exclusion of water supply services from the regulation of "public 
local services" (under Article 4(3) of Decree-Law 13 August 2001, no. 138, converted into Law 14 
September 2011, no. 148, as amended)”. Although there is no reference to Art. 4.2 TEU, the 
opinion focuses on two aspects that other national Parliaments’ opinions have deemed to be 
enshrined by the provision protecting Member States’ identity: on the one hand, the role of national 
and local government which is encroached upon a non justified supranational action, and on the 
other, the national specificity which afford to the water supply service a special protection, due to 
the Italian referendum on the topic.     
 
To conclude, the analyzed Parliaments’ reasoned opinions and resolutions suggest that the identity 
clause may be invoked to protect national regulatory autonomy from an EU act that, while pursuing 
a legitimate objective, significantly constrains Member States’ action in an area where the Treaty 
itself affords the Member States a broad scope of maneuver. All of them seem to take into account 
issues related to choice of the legal basis. It remains to be seen if and to what extent the 
Commission will take into account its proposal’s implications on Services of general economic 
interest, rather than focusing exclusively on the proposal’s expediency vis-à-vis its internal market 
objective.16 
 
5.	  The	  proposal	  on	  the	  temporary	  reintroduction	  of	  controls	  at	  
internal	  borders	  in	  exceptional	  circumstances	  
 
The Swedish Parliament issued a reasoned opinion on the Commission’s proposal for 
amending Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances (COM (2011) 
560).17 In the opinion presented from the Committee on Justice, the Swedish Parliament considers 
that the reintroduction of internal borders controls in the case of threats to general order or internal 
security does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, because as per Art. 4.2 TEU and Art. 72 
                                                
16 In the reply of the Commission to the Cortes Generales and to the Bavarian national Parliaments, the Commission 
seems to defend its position which grounds EU action on the absence of clear rules at Union level governing the award 
of concession contracts which have triggered legal uncertainty, obstacles to the market, and a lack of adequate judicial 
guarantees for the tenders. 
17 Statement 2011/12:JuU13 Appendix: Reasoned opinion of the Riksdag, available at www.ipex.eu. 
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TFEU “national security and the maintenance of law and order continue to be the responsibility of 
each member state”. Notwithstanding the Swedish Government’s assessment that a certain degree 
of influence must be given to the Union in order to make all member states apply the same controls 
of both external and internal borders within the Schengen cooperation, the Riksdag considers that 
“the goals …of the Commission’s proposal can be better achieved if the right to decide about the 
reintroduction if internal borders controls remains with the individual member States”.  
It is very interesting to analyze the answer of the Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom.18 While 
respecting some member States expressed doubts about the compliance of the proposal with the 
principle of subsidiarity and of Art. 4.2 TEU, she stresses that as per Art. 3.2 TEU, and Art. 67 and 
77 TFEU, the EU has the authority to develop an area without internal borders, in which free 
movement is guaranteed. Therefore any legislation aiming at this objective—and also any exception 
to the general rule—shall be adopted at the EU level. Moreover, since in the proposal the internal 
border controls can only be reintroduced by the Commission with the help of comitology, it is 
possible for Member States to examine the Commission’s implementing powers. Last but not least, 
the decision to reintroduce internal borders’ controls is never sole of national interest, since it has 
far reaching humanitarian and economic consequences that stretch beyond a member state’s 
territory. Since “reintroducing controls at such borders affects freedom of movement for citizens in 
all member states it is therefore important that there is a mechanism that ensures that all measures 
that limit freedom of movement are both necessary and proportionate” (p. 2).   
Also the Dutch Senate and the House of Representatives sent a joint reasoned opinion on 8 
November 2011 doubting about the compliance of the proposal with the principle of subsidiarity. 
The Joint opinion stresses how the amendment proposal solicits a shift of power from the Member 
States to the EU as to the reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders in exceptional 
situations. Indeed, while according to the Schengen Borders code (562/2006) Member States may, 
by way of exception and in the event of a serious threat to internal security or public order, 
reintroduce internal borders controls for a period of at most 30 days (or for the foreseeable duration 
of the threat), the amendment proposal delivers to the Commission the power to reintroduce those 
controls, upon a request by the Members States. Moreover, also in those cases in which exceptional 
circumstances require a direct and immediate action by a Member State, this can act autonomously 
only for five days (thereafter, it is still up to the Commission to prolong the borders control).  
In contesting this shift of power from the Member States to the EU, the Joint Opinion focuses on 
the legal basis chosen for the proposal, namely art. 77 para. 1 and 2 which entitle the EU to act in 
the fields of border checks, asylum and immigration. However, since the reintroduction of borders 
                                                
18 Reply of Commissioner Mallstrom, 24 October 201, D(2011) 1239888. 
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control envisaged by the proposal is strictly related to the existence of a serious threat to internal 
security—in the sense that is subsequent to it— the Dutch Parliaments invites the Commission to 
take into account other legal bases: first of all, Art. 73 TFEU, according to which the EU 
competences in the area of freedom, security and justice “shall not affect the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order 
and the safeguarding of internal security”; second, Art. 276 TFEU, according to which inn 
exercising its powers “regarding the provisions of Chapters…relating to the area of freedom, 
security and justice, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review 
the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-enforcement 
services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States 
with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”; third, 
the already mentioned Art. 4.2 TEU.   
 
The Joint Committee than concludes that this shift of power from the Member States to the 
Commission in the field of the reintroduction of internal borders controls is in breach of the 
subsidiarity principle because “in light of the TFEU, this competence clearly lies with the Member 
States”. Moreover, “the Member States have existing procedures to carry out these controls and are 
better able to assess and to decide on the reintroduction of such controls. The national authorities 
are, after all, in the best position to assess the specific local circumstances”.  
 
6.	  The	  proposal	  on	  the	  Community	  financial	  measures	  for	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  common	  fisheries	  policy	  
 
Also the Italian Senate has referred to the protection of national identity (although without 
explicitly mentioning Art. 4.2 TEU) in the Resolution of the Standing Committee on Agricolture 
and Agrifood Production of 8 June 2010 on  the “Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 861/2006 of 22 May 2006 
establishing Community financial measures for the implementation of the common fisheries policy 
and in the area of the Law of the Sea (COM (2010) 145 final)”.  
Unlike within the other analyzed national Parliaments’ reasoned opinions, the Committee gives a 
positive opinion as far as the principle of subsidiarity is concerned. In this respect, the Community 
proposal for establishing Community financial measures for the implementation of the common 
fisheries policy sets out objectives which can not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
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and makes more suitable to the achievement of those purposes, and therefore required, action at 
Community level. 
It is in the following consideration of the Resolution of the Standing Committee, related to the 
“merit” of the proposal, that the issue of the protection of national identity is raised.  In particular, 
the Committee focuses on the amendment to the proposal provided by Article 5, which endorses 
datasets on the level of fishing, the performance of the fishing industry, etc. which incorporate 
biological, technical, environmental, and socioeconomic information. The Committee expressly 
“welcomes the incorporation of socio-economic information in the datasets under Article 5 of the 
regulation, also with a view to protect the role of inshore fishing which, although neglected at EU 
level, is of considerable importance for Italy, where such industry is characterised by a network of 
small companies of time-honoured tradition closely connected with the country's national identity” 
(emphasis added).  Moreover, the Committee stresses that “it would be appropriate to take into 
account the type and size of fisheries and to balance the unquestionable need to protect and preserve 
fish stocks with economic, social and environmental requirements in the stock assessment under 
Article 11, so as to ensure acceptable living standards for small and major actors involved in 
fishing, profitability of the industry and environmental sustainability”.  
At the end, the Committee invites the Italian Government to follow up on these recommendations at 
both domestic and EU level. It is likely that the Committee is complaining about a non adequate 
consultation between the Parliament and the Government on European affairs. In this respect, the 
commented Resolution can be compared with the first negative opinion of the Senate on the 
compliance of an EU proposal with the principle of subsidiarity —issued by the same Committee in 
the same day and related to fishery policy as well (COM (2010) 176 def.; XVI leg., doc. XVIII, n. 
41). Rather than being based on the legal question on which level of government was more suitable 
to act in the case of sharing competences, the negative opinion was issued with a strong political 
significance. It has been argued that on the one hand, being the national fisheries sector in serious 
trouble, the opinion aimed at protecting a specific national interest. On the other hand, it aimed at 
warning national Government not to neglect its duty to provide the Parliament with a constant, 
timely, and especially qualified information on European proposals stemming from Italian Law 11 
of 2005 (Fasone 2010: 826).  
Unlike the preaviously analysed reasoned opinions, the concept of national identity is here used 
more as a synonymous of national (economic) interest than as a sort of “competence clause”.  
 
 
  13 
7.	  Concluding	  remarks	  
 
All the examples above show that Art. 4.2 TEU starts to be used in the opinions of national 
Parliaments both in the context of the Early Warning System and in the context of the political 
dialogue with at least a double meaning. In some cases it holds a sort of “competence” function, in 
that  some Member State use the clause to invoke their regulatory autonomy in an area where the 
action of the EU is deemed to be too far-reaching with respect to the provisions of the Treaty which 
reserve to the Member States a certain scope of action. This has been the case both for the proposal 
on the awards of concession contracts and for the proposal on the reintroduction of internal borders 
control in the Schengen area. In some other cases, the concept of national identities is used to 
emphasize national specificities and national economic interest, and to invite the Commission to 
take them into account. This has been the case for the proposal on a Community financial measures 
for the implementation of the common fisheries policy, where the Italian Senate has acknowledged 
the compliance of the EU measure with the principle of subsidiarity but, shifting to the merit of the 
proposal, has reported to the Commission that inshore fishing, having a  “time-honoured tradition 
closely connected with the country's national identity”, deserves to be protected.  
In the first meaning related to the delimitation of competences between the EU and its Member 
States, the use of the identity clause has some implications both on the material and on the 
procedural dimension of subsidiarity (for the distinction see Estella 2002). 
The “material” dimension of subsidiarity is envisaged by Art. 5 TEU, and requires EU action to be 
both necessary to achieve a specific Union goal and value-added if compared with that of lower 
levels of government. Indeed, as far as this dimension is concerned, some of the examples above 
show that the identity clause could help to reframe subsidiarity inquiry from a merely “comparative 
efficiency” test (which in asking which is the most efficient level of government to achieve an 
European objective usually opts for a favor towards EU action) to a test which aims at assessing if 
and to what extent EU action does not intrude too far into national regulatory autonomy. 
Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the empirical evidence outlined in this paper is not 
enough to draw definitive conclusions.  
First of all, it should be specified that  many of the  substantive arguments generally endorsed by 
national Parliaments in their reasoned opinions, do not aim at protecting national competences vis-
à-vis EU competences, but to protect or promote, for example, sectorial economic interests. 
Actually, it has been noted that the fact that only 64 of the 622 notices sent in 2011 by the national 
Parliaments to the European Commission can be characterized as reasoned opinions aimed at a 
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subsidiarity check of EU draft legislation, confirms that most of the Parliaments will not make use 
of this mechanism to block the European decision-making but to have a say on the substance of 
European institutions’ legal and political choices.19 In other words, the need to engage into a 
dialogue with the European institutions might be stronger than the need to protect national 
competences from an expansion of European Union’s action.  
Second, it should be underlined that the position of national Parliaments in the context of both the 
early warning system and of the political dialogue, has happened to be against that of their 
respective national Governments, and sometimes even used to solicit those governments to comply 
with their duty to involve an inform national Parliaments about their “European” activity. This 
means that national Parliament may act as autonomous actors rather than voicing a unique and 
consistent “national” position at the European level (in harmony with their Governments) against a 
“European” one. Having saying that, the analysed reasoned opinions show that the suggested 
argument—i.e. that the involvement of national Parliaments in the monitoring of draft legislative 
acts could potentially help in reframing subsidiarity inquiry from an “EU value-added” to an “EU 
non-encroachment” test—deserves to be explored. This also because a shift of the actors involved 
within the subsidiarity check—“national” Parliaments and not any more “European” institutions 
only—could potentially and legitimately trigger a shift of the questions to be asked.  
This potential change of the “material” dimension of subsidiarity, could also affect the “procedural” 
dimension of subsidiarity (envisaged by Art. 5 of the Protocol no. 2), which requires EU institutions 
to endow draft legislative acts with a detailed statement appraising the compliance of EU proposals 
with the principle of subsidiarity and with qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators 
showing that an objective can be better achieved at EU level. If the Commission starts to reply to 
reasoned opinions of national Parliaments taking into account their concerns regarding the possible 
encroachments of EU action on Member States competences, than it could include this kind of 
assessments also in the motivation of the legislative proposals. In other words, the practice of the 
Commission in replying to the instances of national Parliaments both in the frame of the EWS and 
in the frame of the political dialogue could constitute useful expertise to enrich the explanatory 
memorandums of the proposals, the Impact assessment process, etc. Indeed, while there should be a 
strong (and a functional) connection between European institutions “onus to justify” (De Burca 
1999) and the concrete necessity and comparative efficiency/added value test, in the last years the 
                                                
19 Camera dei Deputati, XIV Commissione (Politiche dell’Unione europea), DOC. XVIII, N. 62, Documento finale, a 
norma dell’articolo 127 del regolamento, su: Legiferare meglio – 19a Relazione riguardante l’anno 2011 (COM (2012) 
373 final), approvato nella seduta del 18 settembre 2012, available at: 
http://www.camera.it/491?categoria=018&numero=062&file=testo. 
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procedural requirements seem to be pretty detached from the material ones, and have acted as 
supplements rather than as complements of them.20 As it has been noted, only in the very first years 
of the European Commissions Annual Reports on Better Lawmaking (dedicated to proportionality 
and subsidiarity) there was a focus on the material criterion of subsidiarity revolving around the 
opportunity of EU action. In the following reports, the issue of subsidiarity seems to have been 
tangled with and to a certain extent—substitute  by—other procedural aspects such as the 
publication of roadmaps which outline the Commission’s intentions, the stakeholders consultation, 
the quality of the drafting, etc. (Ippolito 2007: 205; Russo 2012: 18).  
Besides having an implication on both the material and the procedural dimensions of subsidiarity, 
the use of the identity clause in the analysed reasoned opinions also has some implications in 
defining the scope of the subsidiarity scrutiny. As it has been pointed out “the Protocol governing 
the Early Warning System deals with subsidiarity and proportionality, but that reasoned opinions 
may, strictly speaking, be issued only as regards subsidiarity” (Kiiver 2012: 23). Scholars have 
often criticized this narrow scope of the review, which excludes for examples proportionality and 
all other aspects related to competences (Cartabia 2007: 1096). In our view, it is very difficult to set 
fixed boundaries between all the three principles set out in Art. 5 TEU, such as the principle of 
conferral, related to the delimitation of competences between EU and Member States, and the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, related to the exercise of Union competences. The 
analyzed reasoned opinions show that many Parliaments, focusing on the monitoring of subsidiarity 
principles, end up suggesting to the Commission different legal basis (less intruding upon Member 
States’ autonomy) for the European proposal; or they invite to read the chosen legal basis (which 
for examples allows the Union to act on a functional legal basis such as Art. 114 TFEU or 352 
TFEU) in conjunction with other legal basis which tends to reserve to the Member States the 
regulation of such sensitive issues such as national security (see for example Art. 4.2 TEU and Art. 
72 TFEU). Should Art. 4.2 TEU endorse this trend to reframe the subsidiarity inquiry from an 
“value-added test” to  a “non encroaching” test, it will be more and more difficult to separate issues 
related for example to the legal basis of an act (traditionally associated with the respect of the 
principle of conferral) with issues related with the principle of subsidiarity. And it would be also 
more difficult to separate decisions as to whether to propose action at EU level (subsidiarity) from 
decisions as to the extent and form of EU action (proportionality), since the form of the measures is 
                                                
20 It could be argued that the Protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality attached to 
the Treaty of Lisbon will not probably help in this respect. When compared to the same protocol attached to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, the new Protocol does not explain how the comparative efficiency text should be structured  (i.e. what 
kind of questions European Institutions should ask in applying the principle of subsidiarity), leaving much more space 
to provisions dedicated to the procedural aspects related to the time and scope of the involvement of national 
Parliaments. 
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able to affect the more or less preemptive nature of EU action upon Member States’one. In sum, 
shall the use of Art. 4.2 TEU help in reframing subsidiarity inquiry it could also help to broaden the 
scope of the subsidiarity review looking at Art. 5 TEU in its entirety, i.e. connecting the principle of 
subsidiarity also with the principle of conferral and the principle of proportionality (on the sequence 
of three cumulative steps the Union must pass as per Art- 5 TEU—namely legality, subsidiarity and 
proportionality—see Kiiver 2012: 69). 
 
This broadening of the scope of the subsidiarity control carried out from the Parliaments is a 
welcome feature in the inter-institutional balance of a composite legal order for two reasons.  
First, the monitoring function on the principle of subsidiarity has been attached to national 
Parliaments both to reduce the “democratic deficit” of the system (Sleath 2007) allowing national 
Parliaments to act as “watchdogs” (Cooper 2006) against the overwhelming expansion of Union 
competences (Weatherill 2003). In what has been referred to as a “compensatory” logic (Cartabia 
2007: 1093), the institutions which have lost their proper and traditional legislative functions, 
through a gradual delegation of powers to the EU, have been to a certain extent rewarded with 
monitoring function on the exercise of those power. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that, on the 
one hand, national Parliaments are almost excluded from the Union decision-making process, and, 
on the other, the boldest version of its monitoring functioning (i.e. the possibility to issue a “red 
card” able to stop EU legislation non complying with the subsidiarity principle) was not finally 
included within the Treaty. A broader scope of the subsidiarity review, at least related to the legal 
basis review, would for sure strengthen the powers of national Parliaments in the legislative sphere.  
The second reason why the broadening of the scope of the subsidiarity review could be welcomed, 
is that the thresholds able to solicit the Commission to review its proposal are pretty high and they 
require a coordination among national Parliaments21 which is not always developed (it is not a case 
that the “yellow card” has been reached only once so far). Despite the suggestions of the President 
Barroso, according to which comments on the substance of the proposals raised within the political 
dialogue should be distinguished by the subsidiarity aspects,22 it should be taken into account that 
the opinions in the field of the political dialogue are not relevant to the threshold. In this respect, 
they can trigger the Commission reply, but they cannot affect the amendment of the proposal in line 
                                                
21 On the possible results stemming from a dialogue among Parliaments, see C. Decaro and N. Lupo (2009). 
 
22 As stated by J. Barroso and M. Wallstrom in their letter introducing to the practical arrangements for the operation of 
the subsidiarity control mechanism under protocol no. 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon (Brussels, 1st December 2009, p. 4), 
“As the subsidiarity control mechanism will be applied alongside the political dialogue, which covers all aspects of 
those documents transmitted to national Parliaments, and not only compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, the 
Commission invites national Parliaments to distinguish in their opinions as far as possible between subsidiarity aspects 
and comments on the substance of a proposal, and to be as clear as possible as regards their assessment on a proposal's 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.” 
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with the concerns of the national Parliaments. For this reason, a broader concept of the principle of 
subsidiarity should be endorsed so to allow national Parliament to have a say in the decision-
making process. 
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